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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-1816
___________
JEFFREY A. EYLER,
             Appellant
   v.
*JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
          *(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), F.R.A.P.)
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-00411)
District Judge:  The Honorable Yvette Kane
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 31, 2003
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, NYGAARD, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : November 13, 2003)
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jeffrey A. Eyler appeals from an order entered in the District
Court affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Eyler’s
application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-433.  The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) and we have jurisdiction on appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will affirm
the order of the District Court.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recount the facts
and the procedural background of this case only as they are relevant to the following
discussion.  In 1997, Eyler applied for disability insurance benefits on the basis that he
had been unable to work since November 15, 1996 due to physical problems involving his
back, high blood pressure, diabetes, pancreatitis, a seizure disorder and deafness in his
right ear.  After reviewing the medical evidence, physicians acting on behalf of the
Commissioner concluded that Eyler had the capacity to work.  Eyler’s application for
benefits was initially denied and was again denied on reconsideration.  
3An Administrative Law Judge thereafter conducted a hearing on Eyler’s
application at which she heard testimony from Eyler, his wife, a medical expert and a
vocational expert.    The ALJ subsequently concluded that Eyler’s condition did not meet
the standard for disability.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Eyler filed an action against
the Commissioner in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The case
was referred to an United States Magistrate Judge who recommended that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation, overruling Eyler’s objections.  Eyler timely appealed.
II.
We have previously set forth our standard of review in cases involving an
appeal from the denial of disability benefits.  We have instructed:
The role of this Court is identical to that of the District Court,
namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner’s decision.  The Court is bound by
the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.  Substantial evidence has been defined
as “more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”
  
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)) (certain citations omitted).  In making this determination, “we
are not permitted to weigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions for that of the
4fact-finder.”  Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v.
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1982)).
In order to qualify for disability benefits, a person must be disabled as that
term is defined by the Social Security Act and accompanying regulations.  Burns, 312
F.3d at 118.  Disability is defined under the Act as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2002).  
The ALJ, in evaluating Eyler’s application for benefits, applied the familiar
five-step analysis, determining that, at steps one through three, Eyler was not currently
employed, and that his back disorder, hypertension, diabetes, and pancreatitis were severe
impairments, but that they did not meet or equal any of the impairments listed in
Appendix 1, Subpart P of Part 404 (“Listing of Impairments”).  20 C.F.R.  § §
416.920(d), 404.1520(d).  The ALJ moved on to step four and determined that, while
Eyler did not retain the residual functional capacity to perform his past work, Eyler did
retain the residual functional capacity to perform the requirements of sedentary work.
Finally, at step five, the ALJ consulted a vocational expert.  The ALJ asked the vocational
expert a hypothetical question which took into account all of Eyler’s impairments that
were supported by objective medical evidence.  The vocational expert testified that a
person with impairments such as Eyler’s retained the ability to engage in a significant
5number of simple sedentary and light jobs on a nationwide level.  The ALJ concluded that
Eyler was not disabled and denied benefits.
III.
Eyler’s primary argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in not giving
controlling evidentiary weight to the testimony and opinion of her treating physician. 
Eyler argues that the ALJ’s decision not to credit his treating physician’s opinions was not
based on objective, competent medical evidence.  A treating physician’s findings and
opinions are, generally, given great weight.  Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408
(3d Cir. 1988) (citing Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979)).  However, “the
medical judgment of the treating physician can be rejected on the basis of contradictory
evidence.”  Id.   If substantial evidence in the record supports a conclusion that is contrary
to that expressed by the treating physician, the ALJ may reject the treating physician’s
findings.  Id.
Here, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions in the record.  In
fact, the opinions Eyler relies on, as has been argued by the Commissioner, are opinions
that are not germane to the nature and/or severity of his impairments.  Instead, he calls
our attention to the report and opinion of Dr. Sicilia and Dr. Eder.  Dr. Sicilia’s opinion
was that Eyler was “disabled” and Dr. Eder noted his belief that Eyler was unable to work
1. Citations to the appendix refer to the appendix filed by the Appellant.
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in a “meaningful way.” (App. 444 and 454)1  The District Court noted, “a treating
physician’s opinion with respect to whether or not a plaintiff is disabled from
employment is not entitled to any special deference.  The responsibility of determining
whether the plaintiff is disabled for purposes of receiving DIB lies with the ALJ.” (App.
4).  We agree.  Neither Dr. Sicilia’s nor Dr. Eder’s opinions concern any medical
diagnosis.  Instead, these opinions, in reality, reflect a legal conclusion neither physician
was competent to make.  We agree with the District Court that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Eyler’s second argument on appeal is that the District Court improperly
relied on the opinion of the vocational expert because that opinion did not take into
consideration the effects Eyler’s medication would have on his ability to work.  This
argument is without merit.  As the District Court found, the hypothetical that the ALJ
presented to the vocational expert required that the vocational expert assume a
hypothetical individual who is “[a]ffect[ed] by . . . medication.” (App. 5).  Further, that
hypothetical individual was affected by limitations that included the effects of Eyler’s
medication, e.g. fatigue, an inability to stand for long periods of time, occasional
concentration problems.  We agree with the District Court that this hypothetical “‘fairly
set[s] forth every credible limitation established by the physical evidence.’”(App. 4)
(quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431).
7Finally, Eyler argues that the ALJ failed to take account of his subjective
symptoms, including pain, in determining that he could still perform the full range of light
work.  The ALJ determined that Eyler had a discernible medical condition that could cause his
pain, but that his statements concerning his pain and its impact on his ability to work were not
entirely credible in light of the entire record.
Allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by objective
medical evidence.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.  Once an ALJ concludes that a medical impairment
that could reasonably cause the alleged symptoms exists, he or she must evaluate the intensity
and persistence of the pain or symptom, and the extent to which it affects the individual's ability
to work.  This obviously requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which a claimant is
accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
Here, the ALJ concluded that Eyler had a discernible medical condition that could
reasonably cause the pain of which he complained.  However, although the ALJ determined that
his testimony was “generally credible,” the ALJ thought that Eyler’s testimony about the extent
of his pain was exaggerated.  (App. 26)  The ALJ noted that the record also contained testimony
of one physician’s concern that Eyler was engaging in “drug seeking behavior.” (App. 18)  The
ALJ determined that Eyler could perform light duty work despite his complaints of incapacitating
pain.  That ruling is clearly supported by substantial evidence in this record.  The ALJ cited
specific instances where Eyler's complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were
inconsistent with: 1) the objective medical evidence of record; 2) Eyler’s testimony as to his
rehabilitation and medication regimen; and 3) Eyler’s own description of his daily activities.
8IV.
In conclusion, we are satisfied that the ALJ undertook a comprehensive
examination of the evidentiary record and that substantial evidence in the record supports both
her and the Commissioner’s decision.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
    /s/ Richard L. Nygaard  
Circuit Judge
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